Paper 2022/1713
Breaking a Fifth-Order Masked Implementation of CRYSTALS-Kyber by Copy-Paste
Abstract
CRYSTALS-Kyber has been selected by the NIST as a public-key encryption and key encapsulation mechanism to be standardized. It is also included in the NSA's suite of cryptographic algorithms recommended for national security systems. This makes it important to evaluate the resistance of CRYSTALS-Kyber's implementations to side-channel attacks. The unprotected and first-order masked software implementations have been already analysed. In this paper, we present deep learning-based message recovery attacks on the
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- Keywords
- Post-quantum cryptography CRYSTALS-Kyber side-channel attack masking
- Contact author(s)
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dubrova @ kth se
kngo @ kth se
jgartner @ kth se - History
- 2022-12-13: approved
- 2022-12-10: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2022/1713
- License
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CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2022/1713, author = {Elena Dubrova and Kalle Ngo and Joel Gärtner}, title = {Breaking a Fifth-Order Masked Implementation of {CRYSTALS}-Kyber by Copy-Paste}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2022/1713}, year = {2022}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/1713} }