Paper 2022/1627

The Random Fault Model

Siemen Dhooghe, KU Leuven
Abstract

In this work, we introduce a more advanced fault adversary inspired from the random probing model, called the random fault model, where the adversary can fault all values in the algorithm but where the probability for each fault to occur is limited. The new adversary model is used to evaluate the security of side-channel and fault countermeasures such as Boolean masking, inner product masking, error detection techniques, error correction techniques, multiplicative tags, and shuffling methods. The results of the security analysis reveal novel insights including: error correction providing little security when faults target more bits; the order between masking and duplication providing a trade-off between side-channel and fault security; and inner product masking and multiplicative masking providing exponential protection in the field size. Moreover, the results also explain the experimental results from CHES 2022 and find weaknesses in the shuffling method from SAMOS 2021.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Implementation
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
Encoding Fault Attacks Masking Random Probing Shuffling
Contact author(s)
siemen dhooghe @ esat kuleuven be
History
2022-11-23: approved
2022-11-22: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2022/1627
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2022/1627,
      author = {Siemen Dhooghe},
      title = {The Random Fault Model},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2022/1627},
      year = {2022},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/1627}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/1627}
}
Note: In order to protect the privacy of readers, eprint.iacr.org does not use cookies or embedded third party content.