Security Analysis of Delay-Based Strong PUFs with Multiple Delay Lines

Anita Aghaie; Amir Moradi; Johannes Tobisch; Nils Wisiol

Paper 2022/1574

Security Analysis of Delay-Based Strong PUFs with Multiple Delay Lines

Anita Aghaie

, Ruhr University Bochum, Horst Görtz Institute for IT-Security, Bochum, Germany

Amir Moradi

, Universität zu Köln, Germany

Johannes Tobisch

, Max Planck Institute for Security and Privacy, Bochum, Germany

Nils Wisiol

, Technische Universität Berlin, Germany

Abstract

Using a novel circuit design, we investigate if the modeling-resistance of delay-based, CMOS-compatible strong PUFs can be increased by the usage of multiple delay lines. Studying a circuit inspired by the Arbiter PUF, but using four instead of merely two delay lines, we obtain evidence showing that the usage of many delay lines does not significantly increase the security of the strong PUF circuit. Based on our findings, we suggest future research directions.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Applications
Publication info: Published elsewhere. HOST Symposium 2022
DOI: 10.1109/HOST54066.2022.9840099
Keywords: PUF Strong PUF Modeling Attack
Contact author(s): anita aghaie @ rub de
amir moradi @ uni-koeln de
johannes tobisch @ mpi-sp org
nils wisiol @ tu-berlin de
History: 2022-11-14: approved; 2022-11-13: received; See all versions
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2022/1574
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2022/1574,
      author = {Anita Aghaie and Amir Moradi and Johannes Tobisch and Nils Wisiol},
      title = {Security Analysis of Delay-Based Strong PUFs with Multiple Delay Lines},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2022/1574},
      year = {2022},
      doi = {10.1109/HOST54066.2022.9840099},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/1574}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/1574}
}