Paper 2022/1536

Privacy-Preserving Blueprints

Markulf Kohlweiss, University of Edinburgh
Anna Lysyanskaya, Brown University
An Nguyen, Brown University
Abstract

In a world where everyone uses anonymous credentials for all access control needs, it is impossible to trace wrongdoers, by design. This makes legitimate controls, such as tracing illicit trade and terror suspects, impossible to carry out. Here, we propose a privacy-preserving blueprint capability that allows an auditor to publish an encoding $pk_A$ of the function $f(x,\cdot)$ for a publicly known function $f$ and a secret input $x$. For example, $x$ may be a secret watchlist, and $f(x,y)$ may return $y$ if $y\in x$. On input her data $y$ and the auditor's $pk_A$, a user can compute an escrow $Z$ such that anyone can verify that $Z$ was computed correctly from the user's credential attributes, and moreover, the auditor can recover $f(x,y)$ from $Z$. Our contributions are: * We define secure $f$-blueprint systems; our definition is designed to provide a modular extension to anonymous credential systems. * We show that secure $f$-blueprint systems can be constructed for all functions $f$ from fully homomorphic encryption and NIZK proof systems. This result is of theoretical interest but is not efficient enough for practical use. * We realize an optimal blueprint system under the DDH assumption in the random-oracle model for the watchlist function.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
Anonymous credentials privacy-preserving protocols
Contact author(s)
markulf kohlweiss @ ed ac uk
anna_lysyanskaya @ brown edu
an_q_nguyen @ brown edu
History
2022-11-07: approved
2022-11-06: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2022/1536
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2022/1536,
      author = {Markulf Kohlweiss and Anna Lysyanskaya and An Nguyen},
      title = {Privacy-Preserving Blueprints},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2022/1536},
      year = {2022},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/1536}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/1536}
}
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