Paper 2022/1509
sVote with Control Components Voting Protocol. Computational Proof of Complete Verifiability and Privacy.
Abstract
This document details the cryptographic analysis of the sVote v2.2.1 system - an e-voting solution developed by Scytl for the Switzerland context. We prove the complete verifiability and privacy under the Swiss legislation's informally stated goals. First, we derive the trust model for complete verifiability and voting secrecy from the Swiss Chancellery's requirements [1][2], supporting our interpretation by quotes from and references to relevant excerpts of the ordinance and the corresponding technical annex. Then, based on the derived model, we prove that sVote with Control Components provides complete verifiability and guarantees voting secrecy and the non-disclosure of early provisional results. We demonstrate that sVote fulfills the requirements of the Swiss federal chancellery for completely verifiable E-voting systems. In other words, we show that an adversary cannot break the complete verifiability and voting secrecy properties of sVote without being detected by either the voter or auditors. [1] Technical and administrative requirements for electronic vote casting v 2.0 https://www.bk.admin.ch/dam/bk/en/dokumente/pore/Annex_of_the_Federal_Chancellery_Ordinance_on_Electronic_Voting_V2.0_July_2018.pdf.download.pdf/Annex_of_the_Federal_Chancellery_Ordinance_on_Electronic_Voting_V2.0_July_2018.pdf [2] Federal Chancellery Ordinance on Electronic Voting https://www.fedlex.admin.ch/eli/cc/2013/859/en
Note: The objective of this publication is to make the original proof public since other academic works reference it.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- Keywords
- Swiss e-voting verifiability individual verifiability universal verifiability privacy
- Contact author(s)
- research @ scytl com
- History
- 2022-11-07: approved
- 2022-11-02: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2022/1509
- License
-
CC BY-NC-ND
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2022/1509,
author = {Enrique Larraia and Tamara Finogina and Nuria Costa},
title = {{sVote} with Control Components Voting Protocol. Computational Proof of Complete Verifiability and Privacy.},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2022/1509},
year = {2022},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/1509}
}
