Paper 2022/1456

Resistance of Ascon Family against Conditional Cube Attacks in Nonce-Misuse Setting

Donghoon Chang, National Institute of Standards and Technology, Strativia, Indraprastha Institute of Information Technology Delhi
Deukjo Hong, Jeonbuk National University, National Institute of Standards and Technology
Jinkeon Kang, National Institute of Standards and Technology
Meltem Sönmez Turan, National Institute of Standards and Technology
Abstract

Ascon family is one of the finalists of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) lightweight cryptography standardization process. The family includes three Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) schemes: Ascon-128 (primary), Ascon-128a, and Ascon-80pq. In this paper, we study the resistance of the Ascon~family against conditional cube attacks in nonce-misuse setting, and present new state- and key-recovery attacks. Our attack recovers the full state information and the secret key of Ascon-128a using 7-round Ascon-permutation for the encryption phase, with $2^{117}$ data and $2^{116.2}$ time. This is the best known attack result for Ascon-128a as far as we know. We also show that the partial state information of Ascon-128 can be recovered with $2^{44.8}$ data. Finally, by assuming that the full state information of Ascon-80pq was recovered by Baudrin et al.'s attack, we show that the 160-bit secret key of Ascon-80pq can be recovered with $2^{128}$ time. Although our attacks do not invalidate designers' claim, those allow us to understand the security of Ascon in nonce-misuse setting.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Secret-key cryptography
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
Ascon Conditional cube attack Lightweight cryptography State recovery Key recovery
Contact author(s)
donghoon chang @ nist gov
deukjo hong @ jbnu ac kr
jinkeon kang @ nist gov
meltem turan @ nist gov
History
2022-10-25: approved
2022-10-25: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2022/1456
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2022/1456,
      author = {Donghoon Chang and Deukjo Hong and Jinkeon Kang and Meltem Sönmez Turan},
      title = {Resistance of Ascon Family against Conditional Cube Attacks in Nonce-Misuse Setting},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2022/1456},
      year = {2022},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/1456}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/1456}
}
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