Paper 2022/1441

Tighter Post-quantum Proof for Plain FDH, PFDH and GPV-IBE

Yu Liu
Haodong Jiang
Yunlei Zhao
Abstract

In CRYPTO 2012, Zhandry developed generic semi-constant oracle technique and proved security of an identity-based encryption scheme, GPV-IBE, and full domain hash (FDH) signature scheme in the quantum random oracle model (QROM). However, the reduction provided by Zhandry incurred a quadratic reduction loss. In this work, we provide a much tighter proof, with linear reduntion loss, for the FDH, probabilistc FDH (PFDH), and GPV-IBE in the QROM. Our proof is based on the measure-and-reprogram technique developed by Don, Fehr, Majenz and Schaffner.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
Quantum random oracleFull domain hashIdentity-based encryption
Contact author(s)
yu_liu21 @ m fudan edu cn
History
2023-01-28: revised
2022-10-22: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2022/1441
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2022/1441,
      author = {Yu Liu and Haodong Jiang and Yunlei Zhao},
      title = {Tighter Post-quantum Proof for Plain FDH, PFDH and GPV-IBE},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2022/1441},
      year = {2022},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/1441}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/1441}
}
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