Breaking and Protecting the Crystal: Side-Channel Analysis of Dilithium in Hardware

Hauke Steffen; Georg Land; Lucie Kogelheide; Tim Güneysu

Paper 2022/1410

Breaking and Protecting the Crystal: Side-Channel Analysis of Dilithium in Hardware

Hauke Steffen

, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH

Georg Land

, Ruhr University Bochum

Lucie Kogelheide

, BWI GmbH

Tim Güneysu

, Ruhr University Bochum, German Research Centre for Artificial Intelligence

Abstract

The lattice-based CRYSTALS-Dilithium signature scheme has been selected for standardization by the NIST. As part of the selection process, a large number of implementations for platforms like x86, ARM Cortex-M4, or – on the hardware side – Xilinx Artix-7 have been presented and discussed by experts. While software implementations have been subject to side-channel analysis with several attacks being published, an analysis of Dilithium hardware implementations and their peculiarities has not taken place. With this work, we aim to fill this gap, presenting an analysis of vulnerable operations and practically showing a successful profiled Simple Power Analysis (SPA) and a Correlation Power Analysis (CPA) on a recent hardware implementation by Beckwith et al. Our SPA attack requires 700 000 profiling traces and targets the first Number-Theoretic Transform (NTT) stage. After finishing profiling, we can identify pairs of coefficients with 1 101 traces. The full CPA attack finds secret coefficients with as low as 66 000 traces. In response, we present specific countermeasures and show that they effectively prevent both attacks.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Attacks and cryptanalysis
Publication info: Published elsewhere. PQCRYPTO 2023
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-40003-2_25
Keywords: FPGA Side-Channel Analysis SPA CPA PQC Dilithium
Contact author(s): h steffen @ tuvit de
mail @ georg land
tim gueneysu @ rub de
History: 2023-08-16: revised; 2022-10-18: received; See all versions
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2022/1410
License: CC BY-SA

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2022/1410,
      author = {Hauke Steffen and Georg Land and Lucie Kogelheide and Tim Güneysu},
      title = {Breaking and Protecting the Crystal: Side-Channel Analysis of Dilithium in Hardware},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2022/1410},
      year = {2022},
      doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-40003-2_25},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/1410}
}