Paper 2022/1406
Protecting Dilithium against Leakage: Revisited Sensitivity Analysis and Improved Implementations
Abstract
CRYSTALS-Dilithium has been selected by the NIST as the new stan- dard for post-quantum digital signatures. In this work, we revisit the side-channel countermeasures of Dilithium in three directions. First, we improve its sensitivity analysis by classifying intermediate computations according to their physical security requirements. Second, we provide improved gadgets dedicated to Dilithium, taking advantage of recent advances in masking conversion algorithms. Third, we combine these contributions and report performance for side-channel protected Dilithium implementations. Our benchmarking results additionally put forward that the ran- domized version of Dilithium can lead to significantly more efficient implementations (than its deterministic version) when side-channel attacks are a concern.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
- Category
- Implementation
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- Keywords
- DilithiumMaskingLattice-based CryptographyPost-Quantum CryptographySide-Channel Countermeasures
- Contact author(s)
- olivier bronchain @ nxp com
- History
- 2023-04-12: revised
- 2022-10-17: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2022/1406
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2022/1406, author = {Melissa Azouaoui and Olivier Bronchain and Gaëtan Cassiers and Clément Hoffmann and Yulia Kuzovkova and Joost Renes and Markus Schönauer and Tobias Schneider and François-Xavier Standaert and Christine van Vredendaal}, title = {Protecting Dilithium against Leakage: Revisited Sensitivity Analysis and Improved Implementations}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2022/1406}, year = {2022}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/1406} }