Paper 2022/1402

Sorting Attacks Resilient Authentication Protocol for CMOS Image Sensor Based PUF

Chandan Kumar, Indian Institute of Technology Kanpur
Mahendra Rathor, Indian Institute of Technology BHU Varanasi
Urbi Chatterjee, Indian Institute of Technology Kanpur
Abstract

Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) have emerged as a viable and cost-effective method for device authentication and key generation. Recently, CMOS image sensors have been exploited as PUF for hardware fingerprinting in mobile devices. As CMOS image sensors are readily available in modern devices such as smartphones, laptops etc., it eliminates the need for additional hardware for implementing a PUF structure. In ISIC2014, an authentication protocol has been proposed to generate PUF signatures using a CMOS image sensor by leveraging the fixed pattern noise (FPN) of certain pixel values. This makes the PUF candidate an interesting target for adversarial attacks. In this work, we testify that a simple sorting attack and a win-rate (WR) based sorting attack can be launched in this architecture to predict the PUF response for given a challenge. We also propose a modified authentication protocol as a countermeasure to make it resilient against simple sorting and WR sorting attacks. The proposed work reduces the accuracy of prediction due to simple sorting attack and WR sorting attack by approximately 14% compared to the existing approach.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Applications
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
CMOS Image SensorPUFHardware SecuritySorting Attack
Contact author(s)
ck80152 @ gmail com
mahendra7790 @ gmail com
urbic @ cse iitk ac in
History
2023-03-07: revised
2022-10-16: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2022/1402
License
No rights reserved
CC0

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2022/1402,
      author = {Chandan Kumar and Mahendra Rathor and Urbi Chatterjee},
      title = {Sorting Attacks Resilient Authentication Protocol for CMOS Image Sensor Based PUF},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2022/1402},
      year = {2022},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/1402}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/1402}
}
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