### Sponge-based Authenticated Encryption: Security against Quantum Attackers

##### Abstract

In this work, we study the security of sponge-based authenticated encryption schemes against quantum attackers. In particular, we analyse the sponge-based authenticated encryption scheme SLAE as put forward by Degabriele et al. (ASIACRYPT'19). We show that the scheme achieves security in the post-quantum (QS1) setting in the quantum random oracle model by using the one-way to hiding lemma. Furthermore, we analyse the scheme in a fully-quantum (QS2) setting. There we provide a set of attacks showing that SLAE does not achieve ciphertext indistinguishability and hence overall does not provide the desired level of security.

Available format(s)
Category
Secret-key cryptography
Publication info
Published elsewhere. 13th International Conference on Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQCrypto 2022)
DOI
10.1007/978-3-031-17234-2_12
Contact author(s)
patrick struck @ ur de
History
2022-09-28: revised
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2022/139

CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2022/139,
author = {Christian Janson and Patrick Struck},
title = {Sponge-based Authenticated Encryption: Security against Quantum Attackers},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2022/139},
year = {2022},
doi = {10.1007/978-3-031-17234-2_12},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/139}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/139}
}

Note: In order to protect the privacy of readers, eprint.iacr.org does not use cookies or embedded third party content.