Paper 2022/139
Sponge-based Authenticated Encryption: Security against Quantum Attackers
Abstract
In this work, we study the security of sponge-based authenticated encryption schemes against quantum attackers. In particular, we analyse the sponge-based authenticated encryption scheme SLAE as put forward by Degabriele et al. (ASIACRYPT'19). We show that the scheme achieves security in the post-quantum (QS1) setting in the quantum random oracle model by using the one-way to hiding lemma. Furthermore, we analyse the scheme in a fully-quantum (QS2) setting. There we provide a set of attacks showing that SLAE does not achieve ciphertext indistinguishability and hence overall does not provide the desired level of security.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. 13th International Conference on Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQCrypto 2022)
- DOI
- 10.1007/978-3-031-17234-2_12
- Contact author(s)
-
christian janson @ tu-darmstadt de
patrick struck @ ur de - History
- 2022-09-28: revised
- 2022-02-09: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2022/139
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2022/139, author = {Christian Janson and Patrick Struck}, title = {Sponge-based Authenticated Encryption: Security against Quantum Attackers}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2022/139}, year = {2022}, doi = {10.1007/978-3-031-17234-2_12}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/139} }