Paper 2022/137
Ten years of cube attacks
Marco Cianfriglia, Elia Onofri, Silvia Onofri, and Marco Pedicini
Abstract
In 2009, Dinur and Shamir proposed the cube attack, an algebraic cryptanalysis technique that only requires black box access to a target cipher. Since then, this attack has received both many criticisms and endorsements from crypto community; this work aims at revising and collecting the many attacks that have been proposed starting from it. We categorise all of these attacks in five classes; for each class, we provide a brief summary description along with the state-of-the-art references and the most recent cryptanalysis results. Furthermore, we extend and refine the new notation we proposed in 2021 and we use it to provide a consistent definition for each attack family. Finally, in the appendix, we provide an in-depth description of the kite attack framework, a cipher independent tool we firstly proposed in 2018 that implements the kite attack on GPUs. To prove its effectiveness, we use Mickey2.0 as a use case, showing how to embed it in the framework.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- Keywords
- Cryptanalysiscube attackskite attackalgebraic attacksGPU implementationtweakable black box polynomialsdivision propertyMickey2.0
- Contact author(s)
- eonofri @ uniroma3 it
- History
- 2022-02-09: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2022/137
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2022/137,
author = {Marco Cianfriglia and Elia Onofri and Silvia Onofri and Marco Pedicini},
title = {Ten years of cube attacks},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2022/137},
year = {2022},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/137}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/137}
}
