Paper 2022/1361

Correlation Electromagnetic Analysis on an FPGA Implementation of CRYSTALS-Kyber

Rafael Carrera Rodriguez, LIRMM, University of Montpellier, CNRS
Florent Bruguier, LIRMM, University of Montpellier, CNRS
Emanuele Valea, Univ. Grenoble Alpes, CEA, List
Pascal Benoit, LIRMM, University of Montpellier, CNRS
Abstract

Post-quantum cryptography represents a category of cryptosystems resistant to quantum algorithms. Recently, NIST launched a process to standardize one or more of such algorithms in the key encapsulation mechanism and signature categories. Such schemes are under the scrutiny of their mathematical security, but they are not side-channel secure at the algorithm level. That is why their side-channel vulnerabilities must be assessed by the research community. In this paper, we present a non-profiled correlation electromagnetic analysis against an FPGA implementation of the chosen NIST key-encapsulation mechanism standard, CRYSTALS-Kyber. The attack correlates an electromagnetic radiation model of the polynomial multiplication execution with the captured traces. With 166,620 traces, this attack correctly recovers 100% of the subkeys. Furthermore, a countermeasure is presented for securing the target implementation against the presented attack.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Attacks and cryptanalysis
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Minor revision. PRIME 2023
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1109/PRIME58259.2023.10161764
Keywords
side-channel analysiscorrelation power analysislattice-based cryptographyFPGA
Contact author(s)
rafael carrera-rodriguez @ lirmm fr
History
2024-07-24: revised
2022-10-11: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2022/1361
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2022/1361,
      author = {Rafael Carrera Rodriguez and Florent Bruguier and Emanuele Valea and Pascal Benoit},
      title = {Correlation Electromagnetic Analysis on an {FPGA} Implementation of {CRYSTALS}-Kyber},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2022/1361},
      year = {2022},
      doi = {https://doi.org/10.1109/PRIME58259.2023.10161764},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/1361}
}
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