Paper 2022/1361
Correlation Electromagnetic Analysis on an FPGA Implementation of CRYSTALS-Kyber
, LIRMM, University of Montpellier, CNRS, LIRMM, University of Montpellier, CNRS, Univ. Grenoble Alpes, CEA, List, LIRMM, University of Montpellier, CNRSAbstract
Post-quantum cryptography represents a category of cryptosystems resistant to quantum algorithms. Recently, NIST launched a process to standardize one or more of such algorithms in the key encapsulation mechanism and signature categories. Such schemes are under the scrutiny of their mathematical security, but they are not side-channel secure at the algorithm level. That is why their side-channel vulnerabilities must be assessed by the research community. In this paper, we present a non-profiled correlation electromagnetic analysis against an FPGA implementation of the chosen NIST key-encapsulation mechanism standard, CRYSTALS-Kyber. The attack correlates an electromagnetic radiation model of the polynomial multiplication execution with the captured traces. With 166,620 traces, this attack correctly recovers 100% of the subkeys. Furthermore, a countermeasure is presented for securing the target implementation against the presented attack.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Attacks and cryptanalysis
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- Keywords
- side-channel analysis correlation power analysis lattice-based cryptography FPGA
- Contact author(s)
- rafael carrera-rodriguez @ lirmm fr
- History
- 2022-10-14: approved
- 2022-10-11: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2022/1361
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2022/1361,
author = {Rafael Carrera Rodriguez and Florent Bruguier and Emanuele Valea and Pascal Benoit},
title = {Correlation Electromagnetic Analysis on an FPGA Implementation of CRYSTALS-Kyber},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2022/1361},
year = {2022},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/1361}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/1361}
}
