Toward a Post-Quantum Zero-Knowledge Verifiable Credential System for Self-Sovereign Identity

Abstract

The advent of quantum computers brought a large interest in post-quantum cryptography and in the migration to quantum-resistant systems. Protocols for Self-Sovereign Identity (SSI) are among the fundamental scenarios touched by this need. The core concept of SSI is to move the control of digital identity from third-party identity providers directly to individuals. This is achieved through Verificable Credentials (VCs) supporting anonymity and selective disclosure. In turn, the implementation of VCs requires cryptographic signature schemes compatible with a proper Zero-Knowledge Proof (ZKP) framework. We describe the two main ZKP VCs schemes based on classical cryptographic assumptions, that is, the signature scheme with efficient protocols of Camenisch and Lysyanskaya, which is based on the strong RSA assumption, and the BBS+ scheme of Boneh, Boyen and Shacham, which is based on the strong Diffie-Hellman assumption. Since these schemes are not quantum-resistant, we select as one of the possible post-quantum alternatives a lattice-based scheme proposed by Jeudy, Roux-Langlois, and Sander, and we try to identify the open problems for achieving VCs suitable for selective disclosure, non-interactive renewal mechanisms, and efficient revocation.

Available format(s)
Category
Applications
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
Post-quantum Cryptography Self-Sovereign Identity Verifiable Credentials Zero-Knowledge Proof
Contact author(s)
simone dutto @ polito it
carlo sanna @ polito it
History
2022-09-30: approved
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2022/1297

CC0

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2022/1297,
author = {Simone Dutto and Davide Margaria and Carlo Sanna and Andrea Vesco},
title = {Toward a Post-Quantum Zero-Knowledge Verifiable Credential System for Self-Sovereign Identity},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2022/1297},
year = {2022},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/1297}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/1297}
}

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