Paper 2022/1281

LARP: A Lightweight Auto-Refreshing Pseudonym Protocol for V2X

Zheng Yang, Southwest University
Tien Tuan Anh Dinh, Singapore University of Technology and Design
Chao Yin, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
Yingying Yao, Beijing Jiaotong University
Dianshi Yang, Singapore University of Technology and Design
Xiaolin Chang, Beijing Jiaotong University
Jianying Zhou, Singapore University of Technology and Design

Vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communication is the key enabler for emerging intelligent transportation systems. Applications built on top of V2X require both authentication and privacy protection for the vehicles. The common approach to meet both requirements is to use pseudonyms which are short-term identities. However, both industrial standards and state-of-the-art research are not designed for resource-constrained environments. In addition, they make a strong assumption about the security of the vehicle's on-board computation units. In this paper, we propose a lightweight auto-refreshing pseudonym protocol LARP for V2X. LARP supports efficient operations for resource-constrained devices, and provides security even when parts of the vehicle are compromised. We provide formal security proof showing that the protocol is secure. We conduct experiments on a Raspberry Pi 4. The results demonstrate that LARP is feasible and practical.

Available format(s)
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Published elsewhere. SACMAT '22
Authentication Digital signatures Privacy preserving protocols Key management
Contact author(s)
youngzheng @ swu edu
dinhtta @ sutd edu
cycyyin1 @ gmail com
17112100 @ bjtu edu cn
dianshi_yang @ mymail sutd edu sg
xlchang @ bjtu edu cn
jianying_zhou @ sutd edu
2022-09-28: approved
2022-09-27: received
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      author = {Zheng Yang and Tien Tuan Anh Dinh and Chao Yin and Yingying Yao and Dianshi Yang and Xiaolin Chang and Jianying Zhou},
      title = {LARP: A Lightweight Auto-Refreshing Pseudonym Protocol for V2X},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2022/1281},
      year = {2022},
      doi = {10.1145/3532105.3535027},
      note = {\url{}},
      url = {}
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