Paper 2022/1258

Tightly Secure Chameleon Hash Functions in the Multi-User Setting and Their Applications

Xiangyu Liu, Shanghai Jiao Tong University
Shengli Liu, Shanghai Jiao Tong University
Dawu Gu, Shanghai Jiao Tong University
Abstract

We define the security notion of (strong) collision resistance for chameleon hash functions in the multi-user setting ((S-)MU-CR security). We also present three constructions, CHF_dl, CHF_rsa and CHF_fac, and prove their tight S-MU-CR security based on the discrete logarithm, RSA and factoring assumptions, respectively. In applications, our tightly S-MU-CR secure chameleon hash functions help us to lift a signature scheme from (weak) unforgeability to strong unforgeability in the multi-user setting, and the security reduction is tightness preserving. Furthermore, they can also be used to construct tightly secure online/offline signatures, chameleon signatures and proxy signatures, etc., in the multi-user setting.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Published elsewhere. ACISP 2020
DOI
10.1007/978-3-030-55304-3_36
Keywords
Chameleon hash functions Tight security Multi-user setting Signatures
Contact author(s)
xiangyu_liu @ sjtu edu cn
slliu @ sjtu edu cn
dwgu @ sjtu edu cn
History
2022-09-26: approved
2022-09-22: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2022/1258
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2022/1258,
      author = {Xiangyu Liu and Shengli Liu and Dawu Gu},
      title = {Tightly Secure Chameleon Hash Functions in the Multi-User Setting and Their Applications},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2022/1258},
      year = {2022},
      doi = {10.1007/978-3-030-55304-3_36},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/1258}
}
Note: In order to protect the privacy of readers, eprint.iacr.org does not use cookies or embedded third party content.