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Paper 2022/1232
The Abe-Okamoto Partially Blind Signature Scheme Revisited
, ETH Zurich, Oregon State UniversityAbstract
Partially blind signatures, an extension of ordinary blind signatures, are a primitive with wide applications in e-cash and electronic voting. One of the most efficient schemes to date is the one by Abe and Okamoto (CRYPTO 2000), whose underlying idea - the OR-proof technique - has served as the basis for several works. We point out several subtle flaws in the original proof of security, and provide a new detailed and rigorous proof, achieving similar bounds as the original work. We believe our insights on the proof strategy will find useful in the security analyses of other OR-proof-based schemes.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- A major revision of an IACR publication in ASIACRYPT 2022
- Keywords
- Partially Blind Signatures Blind Signatures OR-proof Forking Lemma
- Contact author(s)
-
julia kastner @ inf ethz ch
lossjulian @ gmail com
xujiay @ oregonstate edu - History
- 2022-10-01: revised
- 2022-09-16: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2022/1232
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2022/1232,
author = {Julia Kastner and Julian Loss and Jiayu Xu},
title = {The Abe-Okamoto Partially Blind Signature Scheme Revisited},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2022/1232},
year = {2022},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/1232}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/1232}
}
