Paper 2022/1232

The Abe-Okamoto Partially Blind Signature Scheme Revisited

Julia Kastner, ETH Zurich
Julian Loss, Helmholtz Center for Information Security
Jiayu Xu, Oregon State University
Abstract

Partially blind signatures, an extension of ordinary blind signatures, are a primitive with wide applications in e-cash and electronic voting. One of the most efficient schemes to date is the one by Abe and Okamoto (CRYPTO 2000), whose underlying idea - the OR-proof technique - has served as the basis for several works. We point out several subtle flaws in the original proof of security, and provide a new detailed and rigorous proof, achieving similar bounds as the original work. We believe our insights on the proof strategy will find useful in the security analyses of other OR-proof-based schemes.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
A major revision of an IACR publication in ASIACRYPT 2022
Keywords
Partially Blind Signatures Blind Signatures OR-proof Forking Lemma
Contact author(s)
julia kastner @ inf ethz ch
lossjulian @ gmail com
xujiay @ oregonstate edu
History
2022-09-19: approved
2022-09-16: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2022/1232
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2022/1232,
      author = {Julia Kastner and Julian Loss and Jiayu Xu},
      title = {The Abe-Okamoto Partially Blind Signature Scheme Revisited},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2022/1232},
      year = {2022},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/1232}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/1232}
}
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