Paper 2022/1224
From Plaintext-extractability to IND-CCA Security
Abstract
We say a public-key encryption is plaintext-extractable in the random oracle model if there exists an algorithm that given access to all inputs/outputs queries to the random oracles can simulate the decryption oracle. We argue that plaintext-extractability is enough to show the indistinguishably under chosen ciphertext attack (IND-CCA) of OAEP+ transform (Shoup, Crypto 2001) when the underlying trapdoor permutation is one-way. We extend the result to the quantum random oracle model (QROM) and show that OAEP+ is IND-CCA secure in QROM if the underlying trapdoor permutation is quantum one-way.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- Keywords
- Post-quantum Security OAEP+ Quantum Random Oracle Model
- Contact author(s)
- ehsan ebrahimi @ uni lu
- History
- 2022-09-15: approved
- 2022-09-15: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2022/1224
- License
-
CC BY-NC
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2022/1224, author = {Ehsan Ebrahimi}, title = {From Plaintext-extractability to {IND}-{CCA} Security}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2022/1224}, year = {2022}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/1224} }