### From Plaintext-extractability to IND-CCA Security

##### Abstract

We say a public-key encryption is plaintext-extractable in the random oracle model if there exists an algorithm that given access to all inputs/outputs queries to the random oracles can simulate the decryption oracle. We argue that plaintext-extractability is enough to show the indistinguishably under chosen ciphertext attack (IND-CCA) of OAEP+ transform (Shoup, Crypto 2001) when the underlying trapdoor permutation is one-way. We extend the result to the quantum random oracle model (QROM) and show that OAEP+ is IND-CCA secure in QROM if the underlying trapdoor permutation is quantum one-way.

Available format(s)
Category
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
Post-quantum Security OAEP+ Quantum Random Oracle Model
Contact author(s)
ehsan ebrahimi @ uni lu
History
2022-09-15: approved
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2022/1224

CC BY-NC

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2022/1224,
author = {Ehsan Ebrahimi},
title = {From Plaintext-extractability to IND-CCA Security},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2022/1224},
year = {2022},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/1224}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/1224}
}

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