Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2022/120

Practical Seed Recovery of Fast Cryptographic Pseudo Random Number Generators

Florette Martinez

Abstract: Trifork is a family of pseudo-random number generators described in 2010 by Orue et al. It is based on Lagged Fibonacci Generators and has been claimed as cryptographically secure. In 2017 was presented a new family of lightweight pseudo-random number generators: Arrow. These generators are based on the same techniques as Trifork and designed to be light, fast and secure, so they can allow private communication between resource-constrained devices. The authors based their choices of parameters on NIST standards on lightweight cryptography and claimed these pseudo-random number generators were of cryptographic strength. We present practical implemented algorithms that reconstruct the internal states of the Arrow generators for different parameters given in the original article. These algorithms enable us to predict all the following outputs and recover the seed. These attacks are all based on a simple guess-and-determine approach which is efficient enough against these generators. We also present an implemented attack on Trifork, this time using lattice-based techniques. We show it cannot have more than 64 bits of security, hence it is not cryptographically secure.

Category / Keywords: cryptanalysis, pseudo-randomness,

Date: received 1 Feb 2022

Contact author: florette martinez at lip6 fr

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20220209:084921 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2022/120


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