Paper 2022/1158

Differential Cryptanalysis of K-Cipher

Mohammad Mahzoun, Eindhoven University of Technology
Liliya Kraleva, KU Leuven
Raluca Posteuca, KU Leuven
Tomer Ashur, KU Leuven, Eindhoven University of Technology
Abstract

K-Cipher is an ultra-low latency block cipher with variable-length parameters designed by Intel Labs. In this work, we analyze the security of K-Cipher and propose a differential cryptanalysis attack with the complexity of $2^{29.7}$ for a variant of K-Cipher with state size $n=24$ bits state and block size $m=8$ bits. Our attack recovers the secret key and secret randomizer values with a total length of 240 bits in $\sim 30$ minutes on a standard desktop machine. We show that it is possible to extend the same attack for an arbitrary set of parameters.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Attacks and cryptanalysis
Publication info
Published elsewhere. IEEE ISCC 2022
Keywords
differential cryptanalysis symmetric cryptography K-Cipher
Contact author(s)
m mahzoun @ tue nl
liliya kraleva @ esat kuleuven be
raluca posteuca @ esat kuleuven be
tomer ashur @ esat kuleuven be
History
2022-09-06: approved
2022-09-06: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2022/1158
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2022/1158,
      author = {Mohammad Mahzoun and Liliya Kraleva and Raluca Posteuca and Tomer Ashur},
      title = {Differential Cryptanalysis of K-Cipher},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2022/1158},
      year = {2022},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/1158}
}
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