Paper 2022/1125
A one-time single-bit fault leaks all previous NTRU-HRSS session keys to a chosen-ciphertext attack
Abstract
This paper presents an efficient attack that, in the standard IND-CCA2 attack model plus a one-time single-bit fault, recovers the NTRU-HRSS session key. This type of fault is expected to occur for many users through natural DRAM bit flips. In a multi-target IND-CCA2 attack model plus a one-time single-bit fault, the attack recovers every NTRU-HRSS session key that was encapsulated to the targeted public key before the fault. Software carrying out the full multi-target attack, using a simulated fault, is provided for verification. This paper also explains how a change in NTRU-HRSS in 2019 enabled this attack.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Attacks and cryptanalysis
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Minor revision. INDOCRYPT 2022
- DOI
- 10.1007/978-3-031-22912-1_27
- Keywords
- chosen-ciphertext attacksnatural faultsimplicit rejection
- Contact author(s)
- authorcontact-ntrw @ box cr yp to
- History
- 2023-12-22: revised
- 2022-08-30: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2022/1125
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2022/1125,
author = {Daniel J. Bernstein},
title = {A one-time single-bit fault leaks all previous NTRU-HRSS session keys to a chosen-ciphertext attack},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2022/1125},
year = {2022},
doi = {10.1007/978-3-031-22912-1_27},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/1125}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/1125}
}
