Paper 2022/1121

Practical Attacks on Full-round FRIET

Senpeng wang, State Key Laboratory of Cryptology, Beijing, China, PLA SSF Information Engineering University, Zhengzhou, China
Dengguo Feng, State Key Laboratory of Cryptology, Beijing, China
Bin Hu, PLA SSF Information Engineering University, Zhengzhou, China
Jie Guan, PLA SSF Information Engineering University, Zhengzhou, China
Tairong Shi, PLA SSF Information Engineering University, Zhengzhou, China
Abstract

FRIET is a duplex-based authenticated encryption scheme proposed at EUROCRYPT 2020. It follows a novel design approach for built-in countermeasures against fault attacks. By a judicious choice of components, the designers propose the permutation FRIET-PC that can be used to build an authenticated encryption cipher denoted as FRIET-AE. And FRIET-AE provides a 128-bit security claim for integrity and confidentiality. In this paper, we research the propagation of pairs of differences and liner masks through the round function of FRIET-PC. For the full-round FRIET-PC, we can construct a differential distinguisher whose probability is 1 and a linear distinguisher whose absolute value of correlation is 1. Moreover, we use the differential distinguisher with probability 1 to construct a set consisting of valid tags and ciphertexts which are not created by legal users. This breaks FRIET-AE's security claim for integrity and confidentiality. As far as we know, this is the first practical attack that threatens the security of FRIET-AE.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Secret-key cryptography
Publication info
A minor revision of an IACR publication in TOSC 2022
DOI
10.46586/tosc.v2022.i4.105-119
Keywords
FRIET Authenticated Encryption Differential Attack Linear Attack Fault Injection
Contact author(s)
wsp2110 @ 126 com
History
2022-12-13: revised
2022-08-29: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2022/1121
License
Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial
CC BY-NC

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2022/1121,
      author = {Senpeng wang and Dengguo Feng and Bin Hu and Jie Guan and Tairong Shi},
      title = {Practical Attacks on Full-round {FRIET}},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2022/1121},
      year = {2022},
      doi = {10.46586/tosc.v2022.i4.105-119},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/1121}
}
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