Paper 2022/1097
Post-Quantum Security of Tweakable Even-Mansour, and Applications
Abstract
The tweakable Even-Mansour construction yields a tweakable block cipher from a public random permutation. We prove post-quantum security of tweakable Even-Mansour when attackers have quantum access to the public random permutation but only classical access to the secretly-keyed construction, the most relevant setting for most real-world applications. We then use our results to prove post-quantum security, in the same model, of three symmetric-key schemes: Elephant (an AEAD finalist of NIST's lightweight cryptography standardization effort), Minalpher (a second-round AEAD candidate of the CAESAR competition), and Chaskey (an ISO-standardized MAC).
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- Keywords
- Post-quantum CryptographyNIST Lightweight CryptographyQ1 model.
- Contact author(s)
-
galagic @ umd edu
cbai1 @ umd edu
jkatz2 @ gmail com
chmaj @ dtu dk
patrick struck @ uni-konstanz de - History
- 2023-10-16: last of 4 revisions
- 2022-08-24: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2022/1097
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2022/1097,
author = {Gorjan Alagic and Chen Bai and Jonathan Katz and Christian Majenz and Patrick Struck},
title = {Post-Quantum Security of Tweakable Even-Mansour, and Applications},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2022/1097},
year = {2022},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/1097}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/1097}
}
