Post-Quantum Security of Tweakable Even-Mansour, and Applications

Gorjan Alagic; Chen Bai; Jonathan Katz; Christian Majenz; Patrick Struck

Paper 2022/1097

Post-Quantum Security of Tweakable Even-Mansour, and Applications

Gorjan Alagic, University of Maryland, College Park, NIST

Chen Bai

, University of Maryland, College Park

Jonathan Katz

, Google

Christian Majenz

, Technical University of Denmark

Patrick Struck

, University of Konstanz

Abstract

The tweakable Even-Mansour construction yields a tweakable block cipher from a public random permutation. We prove post-quantum security of tweakable Even-Mansour when attackers have quantum access to the random permutation but only classical access to the secretly-keyed construction, the relevant setting for most real-world applications. We then use our results to prove post-quantum security—in the same model—of the symmetric-key schemes Chaskey (an ISO-standardized MAC), Elephant (an AEAD finalist of NIST's lightweight cryptography standardization effort), and a variant of Minalpher (an AEAD second-round candidate of the CAESAR competition).

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Secret-key cryptography
Publication info: Published by the IACR in EUROCRYPT 2024
Keywords: Post-quantum Cryptography NIST Lightweight Cryptography Q1 model.
Contact author(s): galagic @ umd edu
cbai1 @ umd edu
jkatz2 @ gmail com
chmaj @ dtu dk
patrick struck @ uni-konstanz de
History: 2024-02-29: last of 5 revisions; 2022-08-24: received; See all versions
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2022/1097
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2022/1097,
      author = {Gorjan Alagic and Chen Bai and Jonathan Katz and Christian Majenz and Patrick Struck},
      title = {Post-Quantum Security of Tweakable Even-Mansour, and Applications},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2022/1097},
      year = {2022},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/1097}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/1097}
}