Breaking SIDH in polynomial time

Damien Robert

Paper 2022/1038

Breaking SIDH in polynomial time

Damien Robert, Inria Bordeaux - Sud-Ouest Research Centre, Institut de Mathématiques de Bordeaux

Abstract

We show that we can break SIDH in classical polynomial time, even with a random starting curve $E_0$.

Note: The article is now published in Eurocrypt 2023

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Public-key cryptography
Publication info: A minor revision of an IACR publication in EUROCRYPT 2016
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-30589-4_17
Keywords: attack sidh
Contact author(s): damien robert @ inria fr
History: 2024-10-07: last of 6 revisions; 2022-08-10: received; See all versions
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2022/1038
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2022/1038,
      author = {Damien Robert},
      title = {Breaking {SIDH} in polynomial time},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2022/1038},
      year = {2022},
      doi = {10.1007/978-3-031-30589-4_17},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/1038}
}