Paper 2022/064

A Framework for the Design of Secure and Efficient Proofs of Retrievability

Françoise Levy-dit-Vehel and Maxime Roméas


Proofs of Retrievability (PoR) protocols ensure that a client can fully retrieve a large outsourced file from an untrusted server. Good PoRs should have low communication complexity, small storage overhead and clear security guarantees with tight security bounds. The focus of this work is to design good PoR schemes with simple security proofs. To this end, we use the Constructive Cryptography (CC) setting by Maurer [13]. We propose a framework for the design of secure and efficient PoR schemes based on Locally Correctable Codes (LCC). We give a first instantiation of our framework using the high rate lifted codes introduced by Guo et al. [5]. This yields an infinite family of good PoRs. We assert their security by solving a finite geometry problem, giving an explicit formula for the probability of an adversary to fool the client. Using the local correctability properties of Tanner codes, we get another instantiation of our framework and derive an analogous formula for the success probability of the audit.

Available format(s)
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint. MINOR revision.
Proofs of RetrievabilityLocally Correctable CodesConstructive CryptographyServer Memory Resource
Contact author(s)
maxime romeas @ inria fr
2022-01-18: received
Short URL
Creative Commons Attribution


      author = {Françoise Levy-dit-Vehel and Maxime Roméas},
      title = {A Framework for the Design of Secure and Efficient Proofs of Retrievability},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2022/064},
      year = {2022},
      note = {\url{}},
      url = {}
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