SIKE Channels

Luca De Feo; Nadia El Mrabet; Aymeric Genêt; Novak Kaluđerović; Natacha Linard de Guertechin; Simon Pontié; Élise Tasso

Paper 2022/054

SIKE Channels

Luca De Feo, Nadia El Mrabet, Aymeric Genêt, Novak Kaluđerović, Natacha Linard de Guertechin, Simon Pontié, and Élise Tasso

Abstract

We present new side-channel attacks on SIKE, the isogeny-based candidate in the NIST PQC competition. Previous works had shown that SIKE is vulnerable to differential power analysis and pointed to coordinate randomization as an effective countermeasure. We show that coordinate randomization alone is not sufficient, as SIKE is vulnerable to a class of attacks similar to refined power analysis in elliptic curve cryptography, named zero-value attacks. We describe and confirm in the lab two such attacks leading to full key recovery, and analyze their countermeasures.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Public-key cryptography
Publication info: Preprint.
Keywords: SIKE side-channel attack zero-value attack countermeasures post-quantum cryptography isogeny-based cryptography
Contact author(s): aymeric genet @ epfl ch
ches22 @ defeo lu
nadia el-mrabet @ emse fr
novak kaluderovic @ epfl ch
natacha linard @ hotmail com
Simon PONTIE @ cea fr
Elise TASSO2 @ cea fr
History: 2022-01-18: revised; 2022-01-18: received; See all versions
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2022/054
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2022/054,
      author = {Luca De Feo and Nadia El Mrabet and Aymeric Genêt and Novak Kaluđerović and Natacha Linard de Guertechin and Simon Pontié and Élise Tasso},
      title = {{SIKE} Channels},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2022/054},
      year = {2022},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/054}
}