Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2022/054

SIKE Channels

Luca De Feo and Nadia El Mrabet and Aymeric Genêt and Novak Kaluđerović and Natacha Linard de Guertechin and Simon Pontié and Élise Tasso

Abstract: We present new side-channel attacks on SIKE, the isogeny-based candidate in the NIST PQC competition. Previous works had shown that SIKE is vulnerable to differential power analysis and pointed to coordinate randomization as an effective countermeasure. We show that coordinate randomization alone is not sufficient, as SIKE is vulnerable to a class of attacks similar to refined power analysis in elliptic curve cryptography, named zero-value attacks. We describe and confirm in the lab two such attacks leading to full key recovery, and analyze their countermeasures.

Category / Keywords: public-key cryptography / SIKE, side-channel attack, zero-value attack, countermeasures, post-quantum cryptography, isogeny-based cryptography

Date: received 16 Jan 2022, last revised 18 Jan 2022

Contact author: aymeric genet at epfl ch, ches22 at defeo lu, nadia el-mrabet at emse fr, novak kaluderovic at epfl ch, natacha linard at hotmail com, Simon PONTIE at cea fr, Elise TASSO2 at cea fr

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20220118:162601 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2022/054


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