Paper 2022/054

SIKE Channels

Luca De Feo, Nadia El Mrabet, Aymeric Genêt, Novak Kaluđerović, Natacha Linard de Guertechin, Simon Pontié, and Élise Tasso


We present new side-channel attacks on SIKE, the isogeny-based candidate in the NIST PQC competition. Previous works had shown that SIKE is vulnerable to differential power analysis and pointed to coordinate randomization as an effective countermeasure. We show that coordinate randomization alone is not sufficient, as SIKE is vulnerable to a class of attacks similar to refined power analysis in elliptic curve cryptography, named zero-value attacks. We describe and confirm in the lab two such attacks leading to full key recovery, and analyze their countermeasures.

Available format(s)
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
SIKEside-channel attackzero-value attackcountermeasurespost-quantum cryptographyisogeny-based cryptography
Contact author(s)
aymeric genet @ epfl ch
ches22 @ defeo lu
nadia el-mrabet @ emse fr
novak kaluderovic @ epfl ch
natacha linard @ hotmail com
Simon PONTIE @ cea fr
Elise TASSO2 @ cea fr
2022-01-18: revised
2022-01-18: received
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Creative Commons Attribution


      author = {Luca De Feo and Nadia El Mrabet and Aymeric Genêt and Novak Kaluđerović and Natacha Linard de Guertechin and Simon Pontié and Élise Tasso},
      title = {SIKE Channels},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2022/054},
      year = {2022},
      note = {\url{}},
      url = {}
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