Paper 2022/053
Brute Force Cryptanalysis
Aron Gohr
Abstract
The topic of this contribution is the cryptanalytic use of spurious keys, i.e. non-target keys returned by exhaustive key search. We show that the counting of spurious keys allows the construction of distinguishing attacks against block ciphers that are generically expected to start working at (marginally) lower computational cost than is required to find the target key by exhaustive search. We further show that if a brute force distinguisher does return a strong distinguishing signal, fairly generic optimizations to random key sampling will in many circumstances render the cost of detecting the signal massively lower than the cost of exhaustive search.
We then use our techniques to quantitatively characterize various non-Markov properties of round-reduced Speck32/64. We fully compute, for the first time, the ciphertext pair distribution of 3-round Speck32/64 with one input difference
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint. MINOR revision.
- Keywords
- Automatic cryptanalysisSpeckdifferential cryptanalysislinear cryptanalysis
- Contact author(s)
- aron gohr @ gmail com
- History
- 2022-01-18: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2022/053
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2022/053, author = {Aron Gohr}, title = {Brute Force Cryptanalysis}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2022/053}, year = {2022}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/053} }