Paper 2022/045
Probing Security through Input-Output Separation and Revisited Quasilinear Masking
Abstract
The probing security model is widely used to formally prove the security of masking schemes. Whenever a masked implementation can be proven secure in this model with a reasonable \emph{leakage rate}, it is also provably secure in a realistic leakage model known as the \emph{noisy leakage model}. This paper introduces a new framework for the composition of probing-secure circuits. We introduce the security notion of \emph{input-output separation} (IOS) for a refresh gadget. From this notion, one can easily compose gadgets satisfying the classical probing security notion --which does not ensure composability on its own-- to obtain a \emph{region probing secure} circuit. Such a circuit is secure against an adversary placing up to
Note: A wrong claim of the original paper about the relation between security notions has been removed (Section 3.3). A security flaw has been patched in the IOS refresh gadget (Section 4).
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Implementation
- Publication info
- A minor revision of an IACR publication in TCHES 2021
- Keywords
- Masking Composition Side-Channel Security (Region) Probing Model Quasilinear Complexity
- Contact author(s)
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dahmun goudarzi @ gmail com
thomas prest @ pqshield com
matthieu rivain @ cryptoexperts com
damien vergnaud @ lip6 fr - History
- 2022-06-23: revised
- 2022-01-14: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2022/045
- License
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CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2022/045, author = {Dahmun Goudarzi and Thomas Prest and Matthieu Rivain and Damien Vergnaud}, title = {Probing Security through Input-Output Separation and Revisited Quasilinear Masking}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2022/045}, year = {2022}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/045} }