Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2022/042

Inapplicability of Differential Fault Attacks against Cellular Automata based Lightweight Authenticated Cipher

AMBILI K N and JIMMY JOSE

Abstract: Authenticated encryption (AE) schemes are a necessity to secure the physical devices connected to the Internet. Two AE schemes, TinyJambu and Elephant, are finalists of NIST lightweight cryptography competition. Another AE scheme, ACORN v3, a CAESAR competition finalist, has been shown to be particularly vulnerable against Differential Fault Attack (DFA), even more than its previous version ACORN v2. TinyJambu is also susceptible to DFA. An optimized interpolation attack has been proposed against one instance of Elephant, Delirium, recently. We propose methods to strengthen these schemes using the Cellular Automata (CA) and increase their resistance to these attacks. The Programmable Cellular Automata (PCA) 90-150 is effectively deployed to make these ciphers robust against DFA. We also provide mathematical analysis of the invigorated schemes and show that significant improvement is achieved in all the three enhanced schemes.

Category / Keywords: implementation / ACORN, TinyJambu, Differential Fault Attack, Optimized Interpolation Attack, Cellular Automata, PCA 90-150, Authenticated encryption

Date: received 12 Jan 2022

Contact author: ambili_p180002cs at nitc ac in

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20220114:073316 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2022/042


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