Paper 2022/018

Pairing-based Accountable Subgroup Multi-signatures with Verifiable Group Setup

Abstract

An accountable subgroup multi-signature is a kind of multi-signature scheme in which any subgroup $\mathcal{S}$ of a group $\mathcal{G}$ of potential signers jointly sign a message $m$, ensuring that each member of $\mathcal{S}$ is accountable for the resulting signature. In this paper, we propose three novel pairing-based accountable subgroup multi-signature (ASM) schemes, which are secure against existential forgery under chosen-message attacks and computational co-Diffie-Hellman assumption. In the first one, we use Feldman’s verifiable secret sharing scheme as an implicit authentication and proof-of-possession for setting up group $\mathcal{G}$. In the second one, the members participating in authentication are decided by the subgroup. In the third one, we consider a designated combiner managing the authentication process. All schemes we propose here require fewer computations in the signature generation, signature aggregation, and verification phases than the pairing-based ASM scheme proposed by Boneh, Drijvers, and Neven. Moreover, our first and third ones solve the open problem of constructing an ASM scheme in which the subgroup $$ of signers is unknown before the signature generation. Besides, we give a method of eliminating the combiner in case of knowing the subgroup of signers $$ in advance. Further, we extend our proposed schemes to aggregated versions. For $$ accountable subgroup multi-signatures, aggregated versions of our proposed schemes output an aggregated signature with the size of a single group ($$) element and require $$ pairings in aggregated signature verification. In contrast, the partially aggregated ASM scheme of Boneh, Drijvers, and Neven gives an aggregated signature with the size of $$ group elements and requires $$ pairings in aggregated signature verification.