Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2022/002

Polynomial-Time Key Recovery Attack on the Lau-Tan Cryptosystem Based on Gabidulin Codes

Wenshuo Guo and Fang-Wei Fu

Abstract: This paper presents a key recovery attack on the cryptosystem proposed by Lau and Tan in a talk at ACISP 2018. The Lau-Tan cryptosystem uses Gabidulin codes as the underlying decodable code. To hide the algebraic structure of Gabidulin codes, the authors chose a matrix of column rank $n$ to mix with a generator matrix of the secret Gabidulin code. The other part of the public key, however, reveals crucial information about the private key. Our analysis shows that the problem of recovering the private key can be reduced to solving a multivariate linear system over the base field, rather than solving a multivariate quadratic system as claimed by the authors. Solving the linear system for any nonzero solution permits us to recover the private key. Apparently, this attack costs polynomial time, and therefore completely breaks the cryptosystem.

Category / Keywords: public-key cryptography / post-quantum cryptography,code-based cryptography

Date: received 31 Dec 2021, last revised 6 Jan 2022, withdrawn 9 Feb 2022

Contact author: ws_guo at mail nankai edu cn

Available format(s): (-- withdrawn --)

Version: 20220209:042624 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2022/002


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