Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2021/943

Breaking the Circuit-Size Barrier for Secure Computation under Quasi-Polynomial LPN

Geoffroy Couteau and Pierre Meyer

Abstract: In this work we introduce a new (circuit-dependent) homomorphic secret sharing (HSS) scheme for any $\log/\log\log$-local circuit, with communication proportional only to the width of the circuit and polynomial computation, which is secure assuming the super-polynomial hardness of learning parity with noise (LPN). At the heart of our new construction is a pseudorandom correlation generator (PCG) which allows two parties to locally stretch short seeds into pseudorandom instances of an arbitrary $\log/\log\log$-local additive correlation.

Our main application, and the motivation behind this work, is a generic two-party secure computation protocol for every layered (boolean or arithmetic) circuit of size $s$ with total communication $O(s/\log\log s)$ and polynomial computation, assuming the super-polynomial hardness of the standard learning parity with noise assumption (a circuit is layered if its nodes can be partitioned in layers, such that any wire connects adjacent layers). This expands the set of assumptions under which the `circuit-size barrier' can be broken, for a large class of circuits. The strength of the underlying assumption is tied to the sublinearity factor: we achieve communication $O(s/k(s))$ under the $s^{2^{k(s)}}$-hardness of LPN, for any $k(s) \leq (\log\log s) / 4$.

Previously, the set of assumptions known to imply a PCG for correlations of degree $\omega(1)$ or generic secure computation protocols with sublinear communication was restricted to LWE, DDH, and a circularly secure variant of DCR.

Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / homomorphic secret sharing, multiparty computation, sublinear communication, learning parity with noise, pseudorandom correlation generators

Original Publication (with major differences): IACR-EUROCRYPT-2021

Date: received 12 Jul 2021

Contact author: pierre meyer at ens-lyon fr

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20210713:162951 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2021/943


[ Cryptology ePrint archive ]