Paper 2021/923
On the (in)security of ElGamal in OpenPGP
Luca De Feo, Bertram Poettering, and Alessandro Sorniotti
Abstract
Roughly four decades ago, Taher ElGamal put forward what is today one of the most widely known and best understood public key encryption schemes. ElGamal encryption has been used in many different contexts, chiefly among them by the OpenPGP standard. Despite its simplicity, or perhaps because of it, in reality there is a large degree of ambiguity on several key aspects of the cipher. Each library in the OpenPGP ecosystem seems to have implemented a slightly different "flavour" of ElGamal encryption. While --taken in isolation-- each implementation may be secure, we reveal that in the interoperable world of OpenPGP, unforeseen cross-configuration attacks become possible. Concretely, we propose different such attacks and show their practical efficacy by recovering plaintexts and even secret keys.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Minor revision. CCS 2021
- Keywords
- OpenPGPElGamal encryptioncryptanalysisDLPside-channel attack
- Contact author(s)
- poe @ zurich ibm com
- History
- 2021-07-09: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2021/923
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2021/923,
author = {Luca De Feo and Bertram Poettering and Alessandro Sorniotti},
title = {On the (in)security of {ElGamal} in {OpenPGP}},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2021/923},
year = {2021},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/923}
}
