Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2021/920

Non-malleable Commitments against Quantum Attacks

Nir Bitansky and Huijia Lin and Omri Shmueli

Abstract: We construct, under standard hardness assumptions, the first non-malleable commitments secure against quantum attacks. Our commitments are statistically binding and satisfy the standard notion of non-malleability with respect to commitment. We obtain the following instantiations:

\begin​{itemize} \item A $\log^\star(\lambda)$-round classical protocol based on quantum fully-homomorphic encryption and the quantum hardness of Learning with Errors. \item A polynomial-round classical protocol based on post-quantum oblivious transfer.

\item A polynomial-round quantum protocol based on post-quantum one-way functions. \end{itemize}

Previously, non-malleable commitments with quantum security were only known against a restricted class of adversaries known as synchronizing adversaries. At the heart of our results is a general technique that allows to modularly obtain non-malleable commitments from any extractable commitment protocol, obliviously of the underlying extraction strategy (black-box or non-black-box), round complexity, and whether communication is quantum or classical. The transformation preserves the quantum security of the underlying extractable commitments, and is new even in the classical setting.

Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / post-quantum, non-malleability, commitments

Date: received 7 Jul 2021, last revised 7 Jul 2021

Contact author: omrishmueli at mail tau ac il

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20210709:174315 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2021/920


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