Paper 2021/903

Nowhere to Leak: Forward and Backward Private Symmetric Searchable Encryption in the Multi-Client Setting (Extended Version)

Alexandros Bakas and Antonis Michalas

Abstract

Symmetric Searchable Encryption (SSE) allows users to outsource encrypted data to a possibly untrusted remote location while simultaneously being able to perform keyword search directly through the stored ciphertexts. An ideal SSE scheme should reveal no information about the content of the encrypted information nor about the searched keywords and their mapping to the stored files. However, most of the existing SSE schemes fail to fulfill this property since in every search query, some information potentially valuable to a malicious adversary is leaked. The leakage becomes even bigger if the underlying SSE scheme is dynamic. In this paper, we minimize the leaked information by proposing a forward and backward private SSE scheme in a multi-client setting. Our construction achieves optimal search and update costs. In contrast to many recent works, each search query only requires one round of interaction between a user and the cloud service provider. In order to guarantee the security and privacy of the scheme and support the multi-client model (i.e. synchronization between users), we exploit the functionality offered by AMD's Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV).

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Published elsewhere. MAJOR revision.35TH ANNUAL WG 11.3 CONFERENCE ON DATA AND APPLICATIONS SECURITY AND PRIVACY (DBSEC'21)
Keywords
Backward PrivacyCloud SecurityForward PrivacyMulti-ClientSymmetric Searchable Encryption
Contact author(s)
alexandros bakas @ tuni fi
History
2021-07-05: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2021/903
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2021/903,
      author = {Alexandros Bakas and Antonis Michalas},
      title = {Nowhere to Leak: Forward and Backward Private Symmetric Searchable Encryption in the Multi-Client Setting (Extended Version)},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2021/903},
      year = {2021},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/903}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/903}
}
Note: In order to protect the privacy of readers, eprint.iacr.org does not use cookies or embedded third party content.