Paper 2021/854
PQC: R-Propping of a Simple Oblivious Transfer
Pedro Hecht
Abstract
Post-quantum cryptography (PQC) is nowadays a very active research field [1]. We follow a non-standard way to achieve it, taking any common protocol and replacing arithmetic with GF(2^8) field operations, a procedure defined as R-Propping [2-7]. The resulting protocol security relies on the intractability of a generalized discrete log problem, combined with the power sets of algebraic ring extension tensors and resilience to quantum and algebraic attacks. Oblivious Transfer (OT) is a keystone for Secure Multiparty Computing (SMPC) [8], one of the most pursued cryptographic areas. It is a critical issue to develop a fast OT solution because of its intensive use in many protocols. Here, we adopt the simple OT protocol developed by Chou and Orlandi [9] as the base model to be propped. Our solution is fully scalable to achieve quantum and classical security levels as needed. We present a step-by-step numerical example of the proposed protocol.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Preprint. MINOR revision.
- Keywords
- Post-quantum cryptographycombinatorial group theoryfinite fieldsR-proppingsecure multiparty computingoblivious transfer
- Contact author(s)
- qubit101 @ gmail com
- History
- 2021-06-24: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2021/854
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2021/854,
author = {Pedro Hecht},
title = {PQC: R-Propping of a Simple Oblivious Transfer},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2021/854},
year = {2021},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/854}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/854}
}
