PQC: R-Propping of a Simple Oblivious Transfer

Pedro Hecht

Paper 2021/854

PQC: R-Propping of a Simple Oblivious Transfer

Pedro Hecht

Abstract

Post-quantum cryptography (PQC) is nowadays a very active research field [1]. We follow a non-standard way to achieve it, taking any common protocol and replacing arithmetic with GF(2^8) field operations, a procedure defined as R-Propping [2-7]. The resulting protocol security relies on the intractability of a generalized discrete log problem, combined with the power sets of algebraic ring extension tensors and resilience to quantum and algebraic attacks. Oblivious Transfer (OT) is a keystone for Secure Multiparty Computing (SMPC) [8], one of the most pursued cryptographic areas. It is a critical issue to develop a fast OT solution because of its intensive use in many protocols. Here, we adopt the simple OT protocol developed by Chou and Orlandi [9] as the base model to be propped. Our solution is fully scalable to achieve quantum and classical security levels as needed. We present a step-by-step numerical example of the proposed protocol.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Cryptographic protocols
Publication info: Preprint. MINOR revision.
Keywords: Post-quantum cryptography combinatorial group theory finite fields R-propping secure multiparty computing oblivious transfer
Contact author(s): qubit101 @ gmail com
History: 2021-06-24: received
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2021/854
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2021/854,
      author = {Pedro Hecht},
      title = {{PQC}: R-Propping of a Simple Oblivious Transfer},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2021/854},
      year = {2021},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/854}
}