Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2021/854

PQC: R-Propping of a Simple Oblivious Transfer

Pedro Hecht

Abstract: Post-quantum cryptography (PQC) is nowadays a very active research field [1]. We follow a non-standard way to achieve it, taking any common protocol and replacing arithmetic with GF(2^8) field operations, a procedure defined as R-Propping [2-7]. The resulting protocol security relies on the intractability of a generalized discrete log problem, combined with the power sets of algebraic ring extension tensors and resilience to quantum and algebraic attacks. Oblivious Transfer (OT) is a keystone for Secure Multiparty Computing (SMPC) [8], one of the most pursued cryptographic areas. It is a critical issue to develop a fast OT solution because of its intensive use in many protocols. Here, we adopt the simple OT protocol developed by Chou and Orlandi [9] as the base model to be propped. Our solution is fully scalable to achieve quantum and classical security levels as needed. We present a step-by-step numerical example of the proposed protocol.

Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / Post-quantum cryptography, combinatorial group theory, finite fields, R-propping, secure multiparty computing, oblivious transfer

Date: received 22 Jun 2021

Contact author: qubit101 at gmail com

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20210624:145056 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2021/854


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