Paper 2021/851
Amun: Securing E-Voting Against Over-the-Shoulder Coercion
, University of Trento, University of TrentoAbstract
In an election where each voter may express $P$ preferences among $M$ possible choices, the Amun protocol allows to secure vote casting against over-the-shoulder adversaries, retaining privacy, fairness, end-to-end verifiability, and correctness. Before the election, each voter receives a ballot containing valid and decoy tokens: only valid tokens contribute in the final tally, but they remain indistinguishable from the decoys. Since the voter is the only one who knows which tokens are valid (without being able to prove it to a coercer), over-the-shoulder attacks are thwarted. We prove the security of the construction under the standard Decisional Diffie Hellman assumption in the random oracle model.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- Keywords
- E-VotingOver-the-Shoulder AttackEnd-to-End VerifiabilityDiffie-Hellman AssumptionFormal Proof of Security
- Contact author(s)
-
riccardolongomath @ gmail com
chiara spadafora @ unitn it - History
- 2023-05-25: last of 2 revisions
- 2021-06-22: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2021/851
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2021/851,
author = {Riccardo Longo and Chiara Spadafora},
title = {Amun: Securing E-Voting Against Over-the-Shoulder Coercion},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2021/851},
year = {2021},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/851}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/851}
}
