Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2021/822

One-out-of-$q$ OT Combiners

Oriol Farrąs and Jordi Ribes-Gonzįlez

Abstract: In $1$-out-of-$q$ Oblivious Transfer (OT) protocols, a sender is able to send one of $q\ge 2$ messages to a receiver, all while being oblivious to which message was actually transferred. Moreover, the receiver only learns one of these messages.

Oblivious Transfer combiners take $n$ instances of OT protocols as input, and produce a single protocol that is secure if sufficiently many of the $n$ original OT implementations are secure.

We present a generalization of an OT combiner protocol that was introduced by Cascudo et al. (TCC'17). We show a general $1$-out-of-$q$ OT combiner that is valid for any prime power $q\ge 2$. Our OT combiner is based on secret sharing schemes that are of independent interest.

Our construction achieves the strong notion of perfect security against active $(\mathcal{A},\mathcal{B})$-adversaries. For $q\geq n$, we present a single-use, $n$-server, $1$-out-of-$q$ OT combiner that is perfectly secure against active adversaries that corrupt a minority of servers. The amount of bits exchanged during the protocol is $(q^2+q+1)n\log q$.

Category / Keywords: foundations / Oblivious transfer, OT combiners, Secret sharing schemes

Date: received 16 Jun 2021, last revised 16 Jun 2021

Contact author: jordi ribes at urv cat, oriol farras@urv cat

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20210616:134401 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2021/822


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