Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2021/817

Give Me 5 Minutes: Attacking ASCAD with a Single Side-Channel Trace

Olivier Bronchain and Gaëtan Cassiers and François-Xavier Standaert

Abstract: In this note, we describe an attack against the ANSSI Side-Channel Analysis Database (ASCAD), which recovers the full key using the leakage of a single masked block cipher execution. The attack uses a new open-source Side-Channel Analysis Library (SCALib), which allows running the leakage profiling and attacking in less than 5 minutes. It exploits well-known techniques, yet improves significantly over the best known attacks against ASCAD. We conclude by questioning the impact of these experimental findings for side-channel security evaluations.

Category / Keywords: Profiled Side-Channel Analysis and Soft Analytical Side-Channel Attacks

Date: received 15 Jun 2021, last revised 16 Jun 2021

Contact author: olivier bronchain at uclouvain be, gaetan cassiers at uclouvain be

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20210616:133657 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2021/817


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