Paper 2021/817

Give Me 5 Minutes: Attacking ASCAD with a Single Side-Channel Trace

Olivier Bronchain, Gaëtan Cassiers, and François-Xavier Standaert

Abstract

In this note, we describe an attack against the ANSSI Side-Channel Analysis Database (ASCAD), which recovers the full key using the leakage of a single masked block cipher execution. The attack uses a new open-source Side-Channel Analysis Library (SCALib), which allows running the leakage profiling and attacking in less than 5 minutes. It exploits well-known techniques, yet improves significantly over the best known attacks against ASCAD. We conclude by questioning the impact of these experimental findings for side-channel security evaluations.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Publication info
Preprint.
Contact author(s)
olivier bronchain @ uclouvain be
gaetan cassiers @ uclouvain be
History
2021-06-16: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2021/817
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2021/817,
      author = {Olivier Bronchain and Gaëtan Cassiers and François-Xavier Standaert},
      title = {Give Me 5 Minutes: Attacking ASCAD with a Single Side-Channel Trace},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2021/817},
      year = {2021},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/817}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/817}
}
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