Paper 2021/806
Boosting the Security of Blind Signature Schemes
Jonathan Katz, Julian Loss, and Michael Rosenberg
Abstract
Existing blind signature schemes that are secure for polynomially many concurrent executions of the signing protocol are either inefficient or rely on non-standard assumptions (even in the random-oracle model). We show the first efficient blind signature schemes achieving this level of security based on the RSA, factoring, or discrete logarithm assumptions (in the random-oracle model). Our core technique involves an extension and generalization of a transform due to Pointcheval (Eurocrypt '98) that allows us to convert certain blind signature schemes that are secure for (concurrently) issuing logarithmically many signatures into ones secure for (concurrently) issuing polynomially many signatures.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- A minor revision of an IACR publication in ASIACRYPT 2021
- DOI
- 10.1007/978-3-030-92068-5_16
- Keywords
- blind signaturesdigital signaturesanonymity
- Contact author(s)
-
micro @ cs umd edu
lossjulian @ gmail com
jkatz2 @ gmail com - History
- 2021-12-10: revised
- 2021-06-16: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2021/806
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2021/806,
author = {Jonathan Katz and Julian Loss and Michael Rosenberg},
title = {Boosting the Security of Blind Signature Schemes},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2021/806},
year = {2021},
doi = {10.1007/978-3-030-92068-5_16},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/806}
}
