Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2021/790

A Side-Channel Assisted Attack on NTRU

Amund Askeland and Sondre Rønjom

Abstract: We take a look at the current implementation of NTRU submitted to the NIST post-quantum standardization project, and identify two strong sources of leakage in the unpacking of the secret key. The strength of the leakages is due to the target processor handling data with very different Hamming weight depending on parts of the secret key. We focus on using only these strong leakages, present a single-trace side-channel attack that reliably recovers a large portion of the secret key, and use lattice reduction techniques to find the remaining parts. Further, we show how small changes to the implementation greatly reduces the leakage without any overhead.

Category / Keywords: public-key cryptography / Post-Quantum Cryptography, NTRU, Side-channel Attack, Power Analysis

Original Publication (in the same form): NIST PQC conference: https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/Events/third-pqc-standardization-conference/documents/accepted-papers/askeland-sid-channel-pqc2021.pdf

Date: received 11 Jun 2021

Contact author: amund askeland at uib no

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20210614:134405 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2021/790


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