Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2021/786

Volume-Hiding Dynamic Searchable Symmetric Encryption with Forward and Backward Privacy

Yongjun Zhao and Huaxiong Wang and Kwok-Yan Lam

Abstract: Volumetric leakage in encrypted databases had been overlooked by the community for a long time until Kellaris et al. (CCS 16) proposed the first database reconstruction attack leveraging communication volume. Their attack was soon improved and several query recovery attacks were discovered recently. In response to the advancements of volumetric leakage attacks, volume-hiding searchable symmetric encryption (SSE) schemes have been proposed (Kamara and Moataz, Eurocrypt 19 & Patel et al., CCS 19). In these schemes, the database is padded in a clever way so that the volume (i.e., the number of responses) for any search query is the same or computationally indistinguishable while keeping the storage complexity and search complexity as small as possible.

Unfortunately, existing volume-hiding SSE schemes do not support atomic updates (i.e., addition/deletion of an arbitrary keyword-document pair), which is the most common update operation considered in the SSE literature. Meanwhile, recent volumetric attacks (Wang et al., EuroS&P 20 & Blackstone et al., NDSS 20) indeed target dynamic databases.

We initiate a formal study of volume-hiding dynamic SSE. We extend the existing definition of volume-hiding leakage function into the dynamic setting and present efficient constructions VH-DSSE and VH-DSSE^k . VH-DSSE suffers from non-negligible correctness error. To remedy the disadvantage of VH-DSSE, we propose a multi-copy construction VH-DSSE^k that amplifies correctness by parallel repetition. As a side contribution, both VH-DSSE and VH-DSSE^k satisfy the strongest notions of backward-privacy, which is the first one in the literature, to the best of our knowledge.

Category / Keywords: foundations / Encrypted Storage, Searchable Encryption, Leakage and Outsourced Encryption

Date: received 10 Jun 2021

Contact author: yongjun zhao at ntu edu sg, foreverjun zhao at gmail com

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20210614:134216 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2021/786


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