Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2021/685

Blind Side-Channel SIFA

Melissa Azouaoui and Kostas Papagiannopoulos and Dominik Zürner

Abstract: Statistical Ineffective Fault Attacks (SIFA) have been recently proposed as very powerful key-recovery strategies on symmetric cryptographic primitives' implementations. Speci cally, they have been shown to bypass many common countermeasures against faults such as redundancy or infection, and to remain applicable even when side-channel countermeasures are deployed. In this work, we investigate combined side-channel and fault attacks and show that a profi led, SIFA-like attack can be applied despite not having any direct ciphertext knowledge. The proposed attack exploits the ciphertext's side-channel and fault characteristics to mount successful key recoveries, even in the presence of masking and duplication countermeasures, at the cost of both side-channel and fault profi ling. We analyze the attack using simulations, discuss its requirements, strengths and limitations, and compare different approaches to distinguish the correct key. Finally, we demonstrate its applicability on an ARM Cortex-M4 device, utilizing a combination of laser-based fault injection and microprobe-based EM side-channel analysis.

Category / Keywords: secret-key cryptography / Fault Injection Attacks, Side-Channel Attacks, Combined Attacks, Statistical Ineffective Fault Attacks

Original Publication (with minor differences): DATE 2021

Date: received 25 May 2021

Contact author: melissa azouaoui at nxp com

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20210528:090838 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2021/685


[ Cryptology ePrint archive ]