Paper 2021/658
A Practical Adaptive Key Recovery Attack on the LGM (GSW-like) Cryptosystem
Prastudy Fauzi, Martha Norberg Hovd, and Håvard Raddum
Abstract
We present an adaptive key recovery attack on the leveled homomorphic encryption scheme suggested by Li, Galbraith and Ma (Provsec 2016), which itself is a modification of the GSW cryptosystem designed to resist key recovery attacks by using a different linear combination of secret keys for each decryption. We were able to efficiently recover the secret key for a realistic choice of parameters using a statistical attack. In particular, this means that the Li, Galbraith and Ma strategy does not prevent adaptive key recovery attacks.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. PQCrypto 2021
- DOI
- 10.1007/978-3-030-81293-5_25
- Keywords
- Key recoverysomewhat homomorphic encryptionGSWstatistical attack
- Contact author(s)
-
prastudy fauzi @ gmail com
martha @ simula no
haavardr @ simula no - History
- 2021-11-16: last of 2 revisions
- 2021-05-20: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2021/658
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2021/658,
author = {Prastudy Fauzi and Martha Norberg Hovd and Håvard Raddum},
title = {A Practical Adaptive Key Recovery Attack on the LGM (GSW-like) Cryptosystem},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2021/658},
year = {2021},
doi = {10.1007/978-3-030-81293-5_25},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/658}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/658}
}
