Paper 2021/627

VeRSA: Verifiable Registries with Efficient Client Audits from RSA Authenticated Dictionaries

Nirvan Tyagi, Cornell University
Ben Fisch, Yale University
Andrew Zitek-Estrada
Joseph Bonneau, New York University
Stefano Tessaro, University of Washington
Abstract

Verifiable registries allow clients to securely access a key-value mapping maintained by an untrusted server. Registries must be audited to ensure global invariants are preserved, which, in turn, allows for efficient monitoring of individual registry entries by their owners. To this end, existing proposals either assume trusted third-party auditors or rely on incrementally verifiable computation (IVC) via expensive recursive SNARKs to make registries client-auditable. In this work, we give new client-auditable verifiable registries with throughputs up to $100\times$ greater than baseline IVC solutions. Our approach relies on an authenticated dictionary based on RSA accumulators for which we develop a new constant-size invariant proof. We use this as a replacement for Merkle trees to optimize the baseline IVC approach, but also provide a novel construction which dispenses with SNARKs entirely. This latter solution adopts a new checkpointing method to ensure client view consistency.

Note: Author Name Edit: Andrew Zitek -> Andrew Zitek-Estrada

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Applications
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Major revision. ACM CCS 2022
DOI
10.1145/3548606.3560605
Keywords
public key infrastructuretransparencyauthenticated data structuresRSA accumulatorsincrementally-verifiable computation
Contact author(s)
nirvan tyagi @ gmail com
History
2025-11-24: last of 2 revisions
2021-05-17: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2021/627
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2021/627,
      author = {Nirvan Tyagi and Ben Fisch and Andrew Zitek-Estrada and Joseph Bonneau and Stefano Tessaro},
      title = {{VeRSA}: Verifiable Registries with Efficient Client Audits from {RSA} Authenticated Dictionaries},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2021/627},
      year = {2021},
      doi = {10.1145/3548606.3560605},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/627}
}
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