Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2021/602

Autonomous Secure Remote Attestation even when all Used and to be Used Digital Keys Leak

Marten van Dijk and Deniz Gurevin and Chenglu Jin and Omer Khan and Phuong Ha Nguyen

Abstract: We provide a new remote attestation scheme for secure processor technology, which is secure in the presence of an All Digital State Observing (ADSO) adversary. To accomplish this, we obfuscate session signing keys using a silicon Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) with an extended interface that combines the LPN-PUF concept with a repetition code for small failure probabilities, and we introduce a new signature scheme that only needs a message dependent subset of a session signing key for computing a signature and whose signatures cannot be successfully forged even if one subset per session signing key leaks. Our solution for remote attestation shows that results computed by enclaves can be properly verified even when an ADSO-adversary is present. For $N=2^l$ sessions, implementation results show that signing takes $934.9+0.6\cdot l$ ms and produces a signature of $8.2+0.03\cdot l$ KB, and verification by a remote user takes $118.2+0.4\cdot l$ ms. During initialization, generation of all session keys takes $819.3 \cdot N$ ms and corresponding storage is $3 \cdot 10^{-5} + 0.12 \cdot N$ MB.

Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / Remote Attestation, One Time Signatures, Secure Processor Architecture, Physical Unclonable Function

Date: received 8 May 2021, last revised 8 May 2021

Contact author: deniz gurevin at uconn edu, marten van dijk at cwi nl, chenglu jin at cwi nl

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20210510:083514 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2021/602


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