Paper 2021/592
Side Channel Analysis against the ANSSI’s protected AES implementation on ARM
Loïc Masure and Rémi Strullu
Abstract
In 2019, the ANSSI released a protected software implementation of AES running on an STM32 platform with ARM Cortex-M architecture, publicly available on Github. The release of the code was shortly followed by a first paper written by Bronchain et al. at Ches 2020, analyzing the security of the implementation and proposing some attacks. In order to propose fair comparisons for future attacks on this target device, this paper aims at presenting a new publicly available dataset, called ASCADv2 based on this implementation. Along with the dataset, we also provide a benchmark of deep learning based side-channel attacks, thereby extending the works of Bronchain et al. Our attacks revisit and leverage the multi-task learning approach, introduced by Maghrebi in 2020, in order to efficiently target several intermediate computations at the same time. We hope that this work will draw the community’s interest towards the evaluation of highly protected software AES, whereas some of the current public SCA datasets are nowadays reputed to be less and less challenging.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Applications
- Publication info
- Preprint. MINOR revision.
- Keywords
- Deep LearningSide-Channel AnalysisMulti-Task LearningOpenSource ImplementationPublic Datasets
- Contact author(s)
- loic masure @ uclouvain be
- History
- 2021-05-10: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2021/592
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2021/592,
author = {Loïc Masure and Rémi Strullu},
title = {Side Channel Analysis against the {ANSSI}’s protected {AES} implementation on {ARM}},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2021/592},
year = {2021},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/592}
}
