Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2021/521

Improved Circuit Compilation for Hybrid MPC via Compiler Intermediate Representation

Daniel Demmler and Stefan Katzenbeisser and Thomas Schneider and Tom Schuster and Christian Weinert

Abstract: Secure multi-party computation (MPC) allows multiple parties to securely evaluate a public function on their private inputs. The field has steadily moved forward and real-world applications have become practical. However, MPC implementations are often hand-built and require cryptographic knowledge. Thus, special compilers like HyCC (Büscher et al., CCS'18) have been developed, which automatically compile high-level programs to combinations of Boolean and arithmetic circuits required for mixed-protocol (hybrid) MPC. In this work, we explore the advantages of extending MPC compilers with an intermediate representation (IR) as commonly used in modern compiler infrastructures. For this, we extend HyCC with a graph-based IR that facilitates the implementation of well-known algorithms from compiler design as well as further MPC-specific optimizations. We demonstrate the benefits by implementing arithmetic decomposition based on our new IR that automatically extracts arithmetic expressions and then compiles them into separate circuits. For a line intersection algorithm, we require 40% less run-time and improve total communication by a factor of 3x compared to regular HyCC when securely evaluating the corresponding circuit with the hybrid MPC framework ABY (Demmler et al., NDSS'15).

Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / Privacy-Preserving Protocols, MPC, Circuit Compilation, HyCC, ABY

Original Publication (with minor differences): SECRYPT 2021

Date: received 20 Apr 2021

Contact author: demmler at informatik uni-hamburg de,stefan katzenbeisser@uni-passau de,schneider@encrypto cs tu-darmstadt de,schuster@encrypto cs tu-darmstadt de,weinert@encrypto cs tu-darmstadt de

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Version: 20210423:122332 (All versions of this report)

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