Paper 2021/495

Hiding Data in Plain Sight: Towards Provably Unbreakable Encryption with Short Secret Keys and One-Way Functions

Mircea Digulescu

Abstract

It has long been known that cryptographic schemes offering provably unbreakable security exist - namely the One Time Pad (OTP). The OTP, however, comes at the cost of a very long secret key - as long as the plain-text itself. In this paper we propose an encryption scheme which we (boldly) claim offers the same level of security as the OTP, while allowing for much shorter keys, of size polylogarithmic in the computing power available to the adversary. The Scheme requires a large sequence of truly random words, of length polynomial in the both plain-text size and the logarithm of the computing power the adversary has. We claim that it ensures such an attacker cannot discern the cipher output from random data, except with small probability. We also show how it can be adapted to allow for several plain-texts to be encrypted in the same cipher output, with almost independent keys. Also, we describe how it can be used in lieu of a One Way Function.

Note: Licensed under CC BY-NC (creative commons attribution-noncommercial) license.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Secret-key cryptography
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Minor revision. ResearchGate.net
DOI
10.13140/RG.2.2.34319.94887
Keywords
EncryptionProvable SecurityChaos MachineTruly RandomOne Time PadOne Way Function
Contact author(s)
mircea digulescu @ mail ru
History
2021-04-19: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2021/495
License
Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial
CC BY-NC

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2021/495,
      author = {Mircea Digulescu},
      title = {Hiding Data in Plain Sight: Towards Provably Unbreakable Encryption with Short Secret Keys and One-Way Functions},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2021/495},
      year = {2021},
      doi = {10.13140/RG.2.2.34319.94887},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/495}
}
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