Paper 2021/477
Exploiting ROLLO's Constant-Time Implementations with a Single-Trace Analysis
Abstract
ROLLO was a candidate to the second round of NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography standardization process. In the last update in April 2020, there was a key encapsulation mechanism (ROLLO-I) and a public-key encryption scheme (ROLLO-II). In this paper, we propose an attack to recover the syndrome during the decapsulation process of ROLLO-I. From this syndrome, we explain how to perform a private key-recovery. We target two constant-time implementations: the C reference implementation and a C implementation available on GitHub. By getting power measurements during the execution of the Gaussian elimination function, we are able to extract on a single trace each element of the syndrome. This attack can also be applied to the decryption process of ROLLO-II.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- Keywords
- ROLLO side-channel attack power consumption analysis key-recovery attack single-trace analysis rank metric LRPC codes
- Contact author(s)
-
agathe cheriere @ irisa fr
lina mortajine @ gmail com
tania richmond nc @ gmail com - History
- 2022-10-24: last of 2 revisions
- 2021-04-15: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2021/477
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2021/477,
author = {Agathe Cheriere and Lina Mortajine and Tania Richmond and Nadia El Mrabet},
title = {Exploiting {ROLLO}'s Constant-Time Implementations with a Single-Trace Analysis},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2021/477},
year = {2021},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/477}
}
